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Summary: The author undertook a research of the procedural drawbacks the 
impeachment of President in Ukraine and Russia. A comparative analysis of the procedure of 
impeachment in both countries was done and the solutions to the problems of simplifying of 
impeachment were proposed. The author presented institutional, lawmaking and procedural 
alterations that could ameliorate the today's possibility to impeach the President.  
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Анотація: Автор здійснив дослідження процедурних недоліків імпічменту 
президента в Україні та Росії. Був проведений порівняльний аналіз процедури імпічменту 
в обох країнах та запропоновані рішення до проблеми спрощення імпічменту. Автор 
представив інституційні, законодавчі та процедурні зміни, які могли б покращити 
сьогоднішню можливість зняти з посади президента.  
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Аннотация: Автор провел исследования процедурных погрешностей 
импичмента президента в Укрине и России. Был проведен сравнительный 
анализ процедуры импичмента в обеих странах и предложены решения проблемы 
упрощения процедуры импичмента. Автор представил институционные законодательные 
процедурные изменения, которые могли упростить возможность снятия с должности 
президента в наше время. 
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As the impeachment of the President is a form of political responsibility of the 
president, the problems of this institution, in practice, are relevant and are the 
object of attention of many national scientists. 
The relevance of this study is that in the process of the structuring of the 
institute of presidency in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, a number of legal 
and political issues in the relationship of the President with other public authorities, 
parties and other political institutions arise, which can largely be compared with 
the problems of the functioning of the presidential authorities in foreign countries. 
Exploring the practice of impeachment on the President in Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation, the following can be stated. At the present stage of 
development there is no equal partnership between the head of state and the 
parliament in these countries. The effect of presidential politics in the state grows 
rapidly in comparison with the legislature. In practice, it turns out that the 
impeachment procedure is complicated with the involvement of several judiciary 
bodies and the decision on dismissal of the president should be passed by too large 
qualified majority (3 / 4 in Ukraine). This negates any attempt to initiate 
impeachment even in the case of the president’s misconduct. In this case, there can 
be no question of absolute domination of political responsibility, which is 
expressed with the support of the president by the parliament. 
The grounds and procedures for bringing the president to justice are 
mentioned in the Constitution and the legislation of the country, and they are 
distinguished by their originality. However, despite their differences, they have 
maintained a unified conceptual approach - the president can not be held liable on 
general grounds as other citizens because of a special official status. In this 
connection, the division of the president's responsibility into political and legal is 
largely contingent and the grounds and the procedure, and the consequences of 
bringing the head of state accountable for the offense obtain primarily political 
rather than legal reasons. 
Article 111 of the Constitution of Ukraine governs the impeachment 
process as follows: "The question of removing the President of Ukraine from office 
on impeachment is initiated by a majority of the constitutional composition of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. To investigate the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall 
establish a special ad hoc commission of inquiry, composed of special prosecutor 
and special investigators. Conclusions and suggestions of temporary investigatory 
commission are considered at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. If 
there are grounds, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with not less than two-thirds of its 
constitutional composition makes a decision on charges against the President of 
Ukraine. The decision to remove the President of Ukraine from office on 
impeachment is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada Ukraine with not less than three 
quarters of its constitutional composition, after verification of the case by the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the receipt of its opinion on compliance with 
the constitutional procedure of investigation and consideration of the case of 
impeachment, and obtaining the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ukraine that the 
acts in which the President is accused, contain elements of treason or other 
crimes[1]. 
In the Russian Federation the impeachment procedure is even more 
complicated. According to Art. 93 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
the President may be removed from office by the decision of the Council of 
Federation on the basis put forward by the State Duma on charges of treason or 
other grave crime, confirmed with the findings of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation in the actions of the President of the Russian Federation of a 
crime and the conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on 
compliance with established procedures when charging. The decision of the State 
Duma to bring an accusation and the decision of the Federation Council on 
impeachment of the President from office must be accepted by two-thirds vote of 
all members of the chambers by at least one-third of the State Duma and the 
findings of the special commission established by the State Duma. The decision of 
the Federation Council on impeachment of the President from office must be made 
not later than three months after the State Duma accused the President. If at that 
time the decision of the Federation Council will not be accepted, the charges 
against the President shall be deemed rejected [2]. 
As for Ukraine, it should be noted that neither the Constitution nor other 
legislation provides guidance on the consequences of impeachment. There is also 
no law that would regulate the procedure of impeachment. Nonetheless a number 
of bills on the subject were drafted. These are the draft law "On elimination from 
the post of President of Ukraine (impeachment)", submitted to Parliament in 
January 2001, by people's deputies of Ukraine G. Buyko, P. Kuznetsov and the 
draft law "On the procedure of removing the President of Ukraine from office by 
impeachment," submitted in August 2002 by people's deputy Mykola Rudkovsky 
[5, p. 187].  
Attention is drawn to the shortcomings of Ukrainian model impeachment, 
which significantly reduces the possibility of applying this procedure in practice. 
If bringing charges against President with not less than two-thirds of the 
constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada is more or less probable, a 
decision on removal from the post of President of Ukraine with not less than three-
fourths vote of its constitutional composition is more than doubtful. 
Nowadays in Ukraine the majority of possible violations of the 
Constitution by the President are faultless in any legal sense. They do not form 
compounds not only of serious, but in general criminal and constitutional 
violations. So, on the one hand, according to Art. 104 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine when President takes office he gives his people the oath which clearly 
undertakes "to respect the Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine" and, on 
the other hand, for violation of this oath he often faces, just hypothetically, no 
electional victory for another term. But no impeachment and criminal penalties are 
involved to any extent. 
In this regard, a list of reasons named in art. 111 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine should be added with "an intentional violation of the Constitution." The 
above ground is determined by the Basic Law of Germany. Constitutions of 
Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia provides such a ground as "a violation of the 
constitution". Also, it would be appropriate to apply to the President of Ukraine the 
institute of impeachment only for crimes committed by intent taking into account 
the significance of the President in the country. Of interest is the opinion of R. 
Dworkin and K.Sunstein which admits that an essential element of the offense for 
which the President is subject to impeachment - "this is a clear link between the 
abnormal behavior of the official and his or her official duties (only the acts such 
as murder and rape are an exception) [4, p. 56]. 
In the scientific researches the proposals are expressed to simplify the 
procedure of impeachment and add alternative subjects that can remove the 
President from office. Thus, according to Ms. Malkina, it would be also 
appropriate to arrange a referendum on early termination of powers of the 
President and the dissolution of parliament in case of maintenance the President by 
the voters at a referendum on the initiative of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine all-
Ukrainian. But, in our opinion, the dissolution of Parliament is a form of political 
accountability of Parliament for inefficiency and inability to make decisions, and is 
unlikely to set the automatic dissolution of the parliament with the support of the 
people of the President in a referendum, as this could lead to a prolonged political 
crisis in the presence of the charismatic head of state and oppositional majority to 
him present in parliament [7, p. 162]. Thus, the real opportunity, in addition to 
impeachment, the adoption of the referendum decision to eliminate the post of 
President will serve as a good leverage over the behavior of the head of state, 
because now the expression of no confidence to President of Ukraine does not 
involve his mandatory retirement, since it is not envisaged by the Constitution of 
Ukraine. 
Speaking about the role of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian Constitutional Court, it is difficult not to agree with Ju. G. Barabash, 
who notes that the role of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine should be limited to 
the expert and supervisory authority [3, p. 52]. Thus the politically biased 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine is invited to obtain the expert authority, which is 
now assigned to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. 
As for the problematic aspects of the implementation of impeachment in 
the Russian Federation, the following shortcomings should be noted: 
– it should be mentioned that the constitutional legislation of the Russian 
Federation does not know the term "impeachment". 
– Russian President may be impeached by the Federation Council only on 
the grounds put forward by the State Duma on charges of treason or other grave 
crimes (Part 1 of Art. 93 of the Constitution). 
First of all, treason (st.275 of the Criminal Code) – refers to gravest 
crimes. According to Article 15 of the Criminal Code all the crimes are divided 
into minor offenses, crimes of average seriousness, grave crimes and the gravest 
crimes. Based on the analysis of the same constitutional provision treason is one of 
grave crimes. 
Secondly, it remains unclear how to behave in the case if the president 
commits any other of the gravest crimes or any crime of minor or average severity. 
It turns out that the offender has the right to stay on as head of state. 
Moreover, the Constitution does not regulate a situation where the 
incumbent president is not formally violating any law, but, is notwithstanding, he is 
seriously harming state interests. As grounds for impeachment are not merely 
purely criminal, but also involve specific offenses, the President shall not be 
politically liabile. In the Russian context, it turns out that the political 
responsibility of the president can be spoken of only in the sense of non-reelection 
for the next term. So, the leverage to force the president to fulfill their obligations 
properly has not been worked out properly [6, c .263].  
All these problems suggest that the current Russian Constitution 
establishes such a basis for the impeachment of the President, under which it is 
virtually impossible. 
More detailed procedure of removal the President from office is stated in 
the regulations of the State Duma and Federation Council. In this aspect, it is 
neccessary to draw attention to an inconsistency between the regulations of the 
chambers. 
Based on the foregoing, we can draw the following conclusions: the 
institute of impeachment proceedings in Ukraine and the Russian Federation is 
primarily a deterrent value, since the president bringing to justice through the 
impeachment process was not applied. Secondly, the grounds and the procedure for 
bringing to justice the president under the Constitution and laws of the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, despite their differences, have maintained a unified 
conceptual approach - the president can not be held responsible on the common 
grounds with other citizens due to the special employment status. Thirdly, the 
range of offenses for which the possible involvement of the president to account, is 
extremely narrow and limited as a rule, treason and serious crimes and, finally, the 
existence of the institute of impeachment plays the role of a warning and means to 
check and balance the government system in both countries. 
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